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Using recent survey data, this paper aims to empirically investigate the state and 
source of Korean citizens’ trust and confidence in the National Assembly. Roughly 
speaking, the National Assembly is trusted only by one out of ten citizens. Since 
the country’s democratization, citizens’ trust and confidence has been eroding. 
Presently, the National Assembly is the least trusted among the key public or 
private institutions. A cross-national comparison of liberal democracies in the world 
shows that only a few national legislatures are less trusted by their citizens than 
the Korean National Assembly. Furthermore, this study confirms the empirical 
validity of performance-based explanation about what factors generate citizens’ 
trust and confidence in the National Assembly. At the aggregate level, an erosion 
of citizens’ trustful attitude toward the legislature is matched by their decreased 
positive evaluation of the overall job performance by the legislature. At the 
individual level, a citizen’s legislative trust and confidence depends mainly on his 
or her evaluation of the performance of the legislature itself, the executive 
interacting with it, or the democratic regime as a whole. Most Koreans pass an 
unfavorable judgment on the performance of the legislature, not because they think 
it is a simply idle institution but because politicians are seen to pursue partisan 
interests too frantically within the institution. Given its drained reservoir of 
citizens’ favorable attitudes toward it, the present National Assembly, even with 
its heightened constitutional status and emerging policy activism, may not be likely 
to serve as a key agent for facilitating democratic consolidation on Korean soil.
Key Words: Korean Citizens’ Trust and Confidence in the National Assembly, 
Performance-Based Explanation, Democratic Consolidation
INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, Korean politics has successfully undergone 
democratic transition and development.2 Korea is now an advanced 
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, U.S.A., August 30- September 2, 2007.
1 In this paper, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea or South Korea.
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electoral democracy in the sense that pluralistic competition through free, 
fair, and regular elections have firmly settled as “the only game in town” 
(Przeworski, 1991: 26) for a change of significant political power. Citizens 
enjoy a great deal of civil liberties and political rights. The rule of law 
has persistently expanded, and the civil society has become invigorated.
These remarkable political achievements notwithstanding, Korea has 
yet to consolidate the country’s democratic politics in the years ahead. 
Regarding the current state of Korean democracy, the relevant evaluation 
by foreign experts outside Korea deserves attention. According to 
Freedom House’s country-by-country analysis, Korea during the year of 
2006 recorded a highest score of 1 on the seven-point scale of political 
rights, and also a second-highest score of 2 on another seven-point scale 
of civil liberties. Forty nine out of 193 independent countries covered 
scored an average of 1 on these two scales, constituting the group of 
freest countries in the world. Next to this group, 13 countries received 
an average of 1.5, making the second-freest group. This group includes 
Korea and two other Asian democracies, Japan and Taiwan (http: 
//www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007).
For another thing, The Economist Intelligence Unit has attempted to 
measure the state of democracy in each country of the world as of the 
end of 2006. The measure also takes into account electoral process and 
pluralism, together with political rights and civil liberties. But this 
measure gives more weight to the elements of political participation, 
political culture, and the functioning of government than does the 
Freedom House index. The analysis by the Intelligence Unit has classified 
165 independent states and two territories into four categories: “full 
democracies” (only 28 polities), “flawed democracies” (54), “hybrid 
regimes” (30), and “authoritarian regimes” (55). The first category 
includes most of the OECD countries, to which only one Asian country, 
Japan, belongs. Korea has not made the grade and falls into the second 
category. Still, Korea ranks 31st out of 167 polities, showing good 
prospects for advancing into the first category of full democracy in the 
near future (http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_ 
INDEX_2007_v3.pdf).
The preceding description suggests that Korean democracy has not yet 
reached a point of no return to its previous authoritarianism. What 
should be done more for the Korean political regime to become 
consolidated as a full liberal democracy? Democratic consolidation means 
that both the elites and ordinary citizens are firmly committed to 
democratic values and working procedures attitudinally and behaviorally 
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as well (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Diamond and Shin, 1999). As to the 
functioning of the government, an effective system of checks and 
balances should be established. This means not only competition but also 
cooperation at the elite level. Politicians have to overcome naked power 
struggle detached from policy competition and to be capable of building 
consensus. Also, elites’ accountability for their deeds to ordinary citizens 
needs to be enhanced by making national governance open and 
transparent. Korea was ranked 42 out of 163 countries surveyed in 
Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Governmental institutions need to raise their level of confidence and 
trust among the citizens. Again, there is room for significant betterment 
on the fronts of political participation, civil liberties, and political culture. 
Ethnic minorities, such as foreign immigrants, could be given 
indiscriminate legal protection and societal inclusion. Women should be 
able to enjoy de facto equality in political, economic, and social spheres 
of life. The existence of the National Security Law should not lead to 
the arbitrary exercise of power in a way of limiting civil liberties.
Given the challenges for democratic consolidation, the National 
Assembly as a political institution is naturally expected to play a crucial 
role of facilitating the consolidation by closely linking the state and civil 
society, or the government and citizens. It symbolizes the ideals of 
representative democracy, and is designed as a key channel of political 
participation and representation on behalf of the people. While making 
laws or major policy decisions and also overseeing the executive branch, 
the National Assembly is to ensure both horizontal accountability among 
governmental institutions and vertical accountability of those in power 
to the general public. Undeniably, the settlement and proper working of 
the legislative institution lie at the heart of democratic consolidation. A 
properly working legislature can serve as a central site where societal 
demands and interests are transmitted into the governmental process. A 
responsive legislature with a robust policy influence can ultimately 
contribute to the maintenance of a democratic regime (see Liebert, 1990; 
Mishler and Rose, 1994; Pridham, 1990; Park, 1997).
In order for a legislature to perform its proper roles well and hence 
to facilitate the consolidation of democracy, it requires a considerable 
level of citizens’ favorable attitudes toward it. Citizens’ trust and 
confidence in, or support for the legislative institution constitutes the 
core of their positive attitudes toward it. The relationship between such 
attitudes and a well-functioning legislature is a reciprocal one. When 
citizens embrace the legislature as a trustworthy institution, a favorable 
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environment is created to help the legislature survive and prosper as 
well. In turn, a properly working and sustainable legislature leads 
citizens to perceive it as a valued institution (Hibbing and Patterson, 
1994; Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984: 159-160; Kim and Park, 1991: 
78; Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979: 283-292; Mishler and Rose, 1994: 8; 
Shin, 1999: 136).
Based on some available survey data, this paper aims to empirically 
investigate Korean citizens’ attitudes toward the National Assembly and 
also the sources of their trust and confidence in the legislature. More 
specifically, the study shows the erosion of citizens’ legislative trust and 
confidence to a significantly low level in democratized Korea. It seeks 
to explain individual variations among Korean citizens in legislative trust 
and confidence mostly in terms of their evaluation about the working 
of the legislature and the regime at large. At the end of the paper, we 
further discuss the implications of the findings for the country’s crucial 
political goal of democratic consolidation.
　
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK AND DATA
The concept of legislative trust and confidence
In this study, the concepts of legislative trust and confidence, or 
legislative support are not finely differentiated one from the other with 
regards to the inherent nature of attitudes, but both are grasped as 
favorable attitudes of a kind toward the legislative institution. We apply 
these two concepts to tap good feeling and will of a generalized and 
diffuse nature toward a legislature rather than positive attitudes toward 
specific policy outputs produced by it. Still, the level of political objects 
toward which citizens hold positive attitudes needs to be theoretically 
specified. Legislative trust and confidence, or legislative support may be 
directed toward the incumbent members of a legislature, the legislative 
institution as a collectivity, or the representative regime in which a 
legislature is embedded and operates in interaction with other 
governmental institutions under constitutional rules. Among these 
different levels of political objects, this study focuses mainly on the level 
of a legislative institution.
Although the existing literature on citizens’ attitudes toward the 
legislature may suggest subtle differences in nuance between the concept 
of legislative trust and confidence, and that of legislative support, this 
study does not much dwell on them. We delve into the former concept 
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at a great length, while believing it is deeply interconnected and 
complicated with the latter concept. In earlier studies on citizens’ 
attitudes toward the legislature, the concept of legislative support 
prevailed (for example, Boynton and Loewenberg, 1973; Patterson, 
Hedlund, and Boynton, 1975; Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984; 
Mishler and Rose, 1994). These studies were intellectually stimulated by 
Easton (1965) who posited political support as an input variable for 
maintaining the stability of a political system. In this research tradition, 
legislative support is a generic term that refers to individual citizens’ 
attitudes upholding the legislative institution. Thus the question of 
legislative support is raised principally from the angle of the basic raison 
d’eêtre of the legislative institution. On the other hand, more recent 
studies on citizens’ attitudes toward the legislature tend to use the term 
trust or confidence more preferably and frequently than the term support 
(for example, Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Hibbing, 1995; Newton and 
Norris, 2000). Trust and confidence in the legislative institution (for short, 
legislative trust and confidence) seems to be a narrower concept than 
legislative support, the former of which reflects well a dynamic 
configuration of attitudes highly subject to change with time depending 
on what and how the legislature has done. In this study, we rather 
closely follow this recent line of research without ignoring insights 
gained from the earlier studies of legislative support.
Sources of legislative trust and confidence
Citizens will vary in the level of their favorable (or unfavorable) 
attitudes toward the legislative institution. In Korea, with regards to 
social background characteristics, who trusts the National Assembly 
more than his or her colleague citizen does? For what reasons do some 
citizens have a higher level of trust and confidence in the legislature than 
others? We seek answers to these questions about the individual 
variations in legislative trust and confidence analyzing the relevant 
questionnaire survey responses. In this study, we try to offer a set of 
political explanations by focusing on the independent factors directly 
relevant to the arena of representative democratic politics. In explaining 
differing levels of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature, we 
exclude independent variables largely pertinent to the personal and 
private sphere of life, such as one’s interpersonal trust, satisfaction with 
life, and so on.
This analysis tests four explanatory models. First, the performance 
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evaluation model is based on citizens’ evaluation of the performance of 
the legislative institution and regime as a whole. Second, in the member- 
focused model, the key independent factor is citizens’ perception about 
the qualities and activities of legislative members. Third, the civic 
commitment model sets a focus on citizens’ competence, engagement, 
and commitment for maintaining democracy. Last, in the partisanship 
model, citizens’ ideological orientation and party preference matter for 
explaining their level of legislative trust and confidence.
The performance evaluation model is predicated on the notion that 
attitudes toward the legislature change with perceptions of how well it, 
other governmental institutions closely interacting with it, and the entire 
regime perform. Indeed, prior research on legislative support or 
legislative trust and confidence in emerging democracies (Hibbing and 
Patterson, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1994) has shown that perception of 
legislative performance is a significant factor. In the context of Korean 
representative politics, citizens’ satisfaction with performance of the 
National Assembly even before Korea’s democratization was associated 
with legislative support (Kim, Barkan, Turan, and Jewell, 1984). The 
legislature is probably the most visible political actor next to the chief 
executive, and citizens’ evaluation of its performance is highly likely to 
reflect its actual performance. Besides legislative performance, the 
performance model of this study considers the responsiveness of the 
central government (the executive branch at the national level) to 
citizens’ needs and interests. Furthermore, the model takes into account 
the working of the democratic regime encompassing the legislature and 
executive. In the study, performance evaluation concerns the overall job 
performance of the legislature and other core governmental institutions, 
and the responsiveness of the regime. It is not specific evaluation 
concerning segmented policy areas.
National Assembly the Institution is conceptually differentiated from 
its constituent individual members. In reality, however, ordinary citizens 
will not readily think of the legislative institution apart from its 
members. In part, they form their attitudes toward the institution via 
their perceptions of the members. This politician-mediated effect on 
legislative trust and confidence is captured by the member-focused 
model. First of all, this model tries to explain trust and confidence in 
the legislature in light of how well an individual citizen knows or 
receives the activities of the member elected from his or her district and 
also how much the citizen likes the member. The members of the current 
17th Assembly got elected under a two-vote mixed system. In the 
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National Assembly, each voter casts two ballots. Two hundred and 
twenty seven members of a total of 299 are elected as representatives 
of single-member plurality districts. The remaining 72 are elected by the 
party vote under proportional representation (PR). Due to the 
predominance of the single-member plurality component, district 
representatives are more visible than PR representatives. Most of the 
National Assembly members do not afford to neglect their duty of 
constituency service for reelection. Studies (e.g., Kim, Barkan, Turan, and 
Jewell, 1984) have shown individual citizens’ contact with their own 
members and awareness of what those members have done generate 
support for the legislature. Next, the model emphasizes that positive 
perception of members in general is likely to carry over to favorable 
attitudes toward the legislature. One recent analysis done by Shin (2005) 
has provided evidence that citizens’ satisfaction with general members’ 
responsiveness to the people is significantly related to trust and 
confidence in the legislative institution.
The civic commitment model suggests that civic orientations and 
engagements, together with general commitment to democratic values 
and principles, have a bearing on legislative support or legislative trust 
and confidence (see Hibbing and Patterson, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 1994; 
Shin, 1999). The specific independent variables relevant to the civic 
commitment model include political interest, sense of political efficacy, 
involvement in organizations usable as a participatory vehicle, and 
preference of democracy over dictatorship, and the like.
The partisanship model is posited for the reason that legislative trust 
and confidence may not be a kind of political attitudes independent of 
an individual’s ideological orientation and party preference. Left versus 
right or progressive versus conservative ideological positions are 
expected to influence attitudes toward the legislature, a core democratic 
institution. In a dictatorial regime, change-oriented citizens are likely to 
favor or uphold the symbol of representative democracy. Yet this 
relationship may go reverse in a liberal democratic regime. Leftists or 
progressives who want to reform the regime for direct grassroots 
democracy may be more discontented with and unfavorable toward the 
existing legislature than rightist or conservatives. Party composition and 
strength vary from time to time. Citizens’ attitudes toward the legislature 
may be tinged with their party predilection. An individual citizen will 
rather see the legislature favorably when his or her preferred party 
controls the legislature by a stable majority than when otherwise.
In testing each model, four social background variables are considered 
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as controls: sex, age, education, and income. By entering these variables 
into the statistical models, we can obtain evidence for confirming social 
locations of legislative trust and confidence. Lee and Glasure (1997), in 
their study of Korean citizens’ confidence in public institutions including 
the National Assembly based on the 1982 and 1990 World Values Survey 
data, have found that old or less educated citizens reveal a higher level 
of institutional confidence than young or better educated citizens. 
Notably, other things being equal, the well educated turn out to be 
critical of and unfavorable toward the existing legislature.
　
Data and variables
The main data used for this study was collected from a nationwide 
sample survey in 2005. The East Asia Institute, Sogang University 
conducted this survey with a commercial polling agency, Research and 
Research, to investigate Korean citizens’ attitudes toward the National 
Assembly from October 21 to November 8 that year. Respondents in the 
Sogang Survey were selected based on multi-stage area sampling and 
quota sampling and were interview face-to face. Also we utilize the 
supplementary datasets: the four waves of World Values Survey (1982, 
1990, 1996, and 2001) and two annual Asia Barometer surveys (2003 and 
2004) administered to Korean citizens (http://www.worldvaluessurvy. 
org; http://www.AsiaBarometer.org). Where appropriate in this paper, 
results of 1996 Korean Democratization Survey are cited for the purpose 
of comparative analysis (Shin, 1999).
In the regression equations estimated for this study, the dependent 
variable is a respondent’s level of trust in the National Assembly. The 
following sets of independent variables are entered into the regression 
analysis. First, evaluation variables concerning institutional and regime 
performance are legislative performance; working of democracy; 
government does right; responsive government; and government for the 
people. Second, attitudes toward National Assembly members include 
like member from own district; know the member’s activity; and 
satisfaction with Assembly members. Third, the variables relevant to 
civic commitment are political interest; political efficacy; political 
discussion; vote in Assembly election; vote in national elections; 
organizational affiliation, and democratic commitment. Fourth, a set of 
partisanship variables encompasses ideology; and strength of party 
preference-- Uri Party preference; GNP (Grand National Party) 
preference; and DLP (Democratic Labor Party) preference. Finally, 
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sociodemographics considered in the analysis are sex, age, education, 
and income. Questionnaire wordings, response categories, and methods 
of their coding are described in Appendix.
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: 
A COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Longitudinal comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature
The four waves of World Values Survey, two Asia Barometer surveys, 
and Sogang Survey generated data for comparing Korean citizens’ 
attitudes toward the National Assembly across time. These surveys have 
been conducted at six different points of time, one during the period of 
the 11th Assembly under authoritarianism and the other five from the 
13th through the 17th Assemblies in the current democratic era.
In each of the four waves of the World Values Survey, citizens’ trust 
and confidence was measured with a four-point scale using the following 
question: “For parliament [the National Assembly], could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in it?” 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much, 
3 = quite a lot, 4 = a great deal (see Appendix) In 1982 when the country 
was ruled under a military authoritarian government, a bit over two 
thirds (68.3 percent) of respondents said they trusted the National 
Assembly a great deal or quite a lot. Korean citizens had a high level 
　
TABLE 1. KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, %
Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org; http://www.AsiaBarometer.org.
World Values Survey Asia Barometer Survey Sogang Survey
Year 1982 1990 1996 2001 2003 2004 2005
Assembly 11th 13th 15th 16th 16th 17th 17th
A great deal 24.9 7.4 3.3 1.4 Trust a lot 1.0 0.4 Trust a lot 1.3
Quite a lot 43.4 26.7 27.8 9.4
Trust to a 
degree
9.7 7.4





25.3 43.2 51.9 49.9
Not really 
trust




None at all 6.4 22.6 17.0 39.3
Not trust at 
all
46.2 54.7
Not trust at 
all
18.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0
(N) (949) (1,238) (1,243) (1,136) (N) (800) (800) (N) (1,200)
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of legislative trust and confidence at the time. Due to their strong 
aspiration for democracy, citizens looked to the national legislature, a 
representative body with great potential for bringing democracy. The 
ensuing three World Values Surveys, however, show a monotonic 
decline in the favorable attitude since after democratization: 34.1 percent 
in 1990, 31.1 percent in 1996, and 10.8 percent in 2001. The levels of 
legislative trust and confidence have drastically become low as compared 
to that level in 1982. This suggests that as the political regime became 
democratized, citizens’ democratic zeal and their vague expectation of 
the national legislature as an engine of democratization weakened to a 
considerable extent. Very importantly, this also implies that due to the 
regime contextual factor one must be cautious about comparing the level 
of public attitudes toward the legislative institution across different 
political regimes. In this study, our longitudinal comparison is confined 
to the present democratic era.
The Asia Barometer surveys of 2003 and 2004 also asked the 
respondents about their level of trust and confidence in the National 
Assembly as follows: “Please indicate to what extent you trust the 
National Assembly to operate in the best interests of society.” 1 = don’t 
trust at all, 2 = don’t really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot. 
This Asia Barometer questionnaire item is worded slightly differently 
than the corresponding item in the World Values Survey. The former 
explicitly leads a respondent to reveal his or her level of legislative trust 
and confidence by judging on the responsiveness of the legislative 
institution to public interest. In other words, Asia Barometer invokes a 
respondent’s evaluation of institutional performance more than the 
World Values Survey. Anyway, in the 2003 Asia Barometer survey, 10.7 
percent of respondents expressed a lot or a degree of trust in the 
National Assembly, which is a level similar to that of the 2001 World 
Values Survey. Then in 2004, 7.8 percent said that they trusted a lot or 
to a degree. Again, we find a decrease in citizens’ legislative trust and 
confidence.
The Sogang Survey, which provides this study with the principal and 
most recent data, asked respondents as follows: “To what extent do you 
trust the National Assembly?” In a substantive sense, the wording is 
closer to the World Values Survey than to Asia Barometer. Still, unlike 
these two datasets, the Sogang Survey generates a five-point measure of 
institutional confidence rather than a four-point one (1 = do not trust at 
all, 2 = rather not trust, 3 = so-so, 4 = trust to a degree, 5 = trust a lot). 
In this survey, only 6.6 percent indicated a lot or a degree of trust.
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Considering all the survey results shown above, one is struck with a 
clear longitudinal drainage of trust and confidence in the National 
Assembly during the years of democratic politics. The current aggregate 
level of legislative trust and confidence remains 10 percent or so. Five 
or ten years ago, the level hovered around 30 percent. It is clear that 
the level of citizens’ trust in National Assembly now has almost hit its 
nadir.
In a democratic regime, the representative assembly is closest to the 
people than any other public authority. The members are directly elected 
by the people, and their every action is watched by the electorate. As 
compared to the executive or judiciary, the representative institution is 
the most open to the public, and hence the most vulnerable to criticism 
by the attentive public. In this vein, it seems highly difficult for the 
National Assembly to enjoy citizens’ trust at a higher level than does 
the civil service or any law-enforcing institution. Even considering this, 
however, the current National Assembly receives too little favorable 
attitudes from ordinary citizens, being degraded to a target of ridicule. 
This is a dismal condition for the proper working of the legislature as 
a core democratic institution.
Why has the already not-so-high trust and confidence among Korean 
citizens in the National Assembly further declined over the past decade? 
Answering this question in a systematic manner requires the time-series 
aggregated data for candidate independent variables, which cannot be 
readily available at hand for this study. Here in this paper we suggest 
a reasonable hunch and examine it roughly. A simple but undeniable 
answer may be that the legislature has become less trusted than before, 
because more and more citizens have gotten disenchanted with the way 
this institution does its due work. In fact, we have found an increase 
in such unfavorable perception within a great bulk of the Korean 
citizenry in the past decade.
In his 1996 Korean Democratization survey, Shin included a question 
asking respondents to indicate how well or poorly they thought the 
National Assembly performed its duties for the country. Four response 
categories were given: “very well,” “somewhat well,” “somewhat 
poorly,” and “very poorly.” As seen in Table 2, “Somewhat poorly” was 
the modal response recording 57 percent. The most negative answer 
“very poorly” constituted about one-eighth (13 percent). Very few (1 
percent) believed that it performed the most positively, “very well.” Less 
than a third (29 percent) said “somewhat well.” Thus, a decade ago, 
seven of ten Korean citizens evaluated the job performance of the 
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TABLE 2. KOREAN CITIZENS’ EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, %
 Source: a1996 Korean Democratization Survey, cited from Shin, 1999, p. 149. 
legislature in a negative way (Shin, 1999: 146-147).
Likewise, in 2005, the Sogang Survey has investigated how Korean 
citizens think of their national legislature’s job performance. The relevant 
survey question was: “How do you think the National Assembly 
performs its role?” The distribution of responses showed the following 
pattern: “very well,” 0.6 percent; “somewhat well,” 4.4 percent; “so-so,” 
28.6 percent; “somewhat poorly,” 47.5 percent; and “very poorly,” 18.9 
percent. The greatest number of people answered in a somewhat 
negative way. Because of a five-point scale, these results may not be 
directly comparable to those of Shin’s previous study. A middle-ground 
response like “so-so” tends to attract its adjacent responses, “somewhat 
well” and “somewhat poorly.” For this reason, one had better look at 
the extreme responses. The most positive response is slightly lower than 
that in the context of Shin’s study using a four-point scale, but the most 
negative response has significantly increased from 13 percent to 18.9 
percent. In all probability, this implies that Korean citizens now evaluate 
the working of the National Assembly more unfavorably than they did 
a decade ago. We are tempted to argue that at the aggregate level an 
erosion of trust and confidence in the National Assembly is matched by 
a negative perception of its performance.
　
Comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence across institutions or organizations
A set of survey data used for this study give plenty information about 
Korean citizens’ trust and confidence in a range of state or public-sector 





How the National Assembly performs its role How the National Assembly performs its role
Very well 1 Very well 0.6
Somewhat well 4.4
Somewhat well 29 So-so 28.6
Somewhat poorly 57 Somewhat poorly 47.5
Very poorly 13 Very poorly 18.9
Total 100 Total 100.0
(N) (1,000) (N) (1,200)
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institutions covered and response categories vary one survey from 
another. In the 2001 World Values Survey, non-profit organizations such 
as environmental protection movement and women’s movement received 
a great deal or quite a lot answers from 74.4 percent and 70.5 percent 
of the respondents, respectively. Next, among six state or public-sector 
institutions (civil services, the military, the police, the central 
government, political parties, and the National Assembly), the civil 
services were trusted a great deal or quite a lot by about two thirds of 
respondents (66.6 percent), which turned out to be the most favored 
among the six public institutions. The other public institutions that 
obtained a positive response from a majority were the military (64.3 
percent) and the police (50.2 percent). On the other hand, the remaining 
three public institutions did not enjoy a high level of trust and 
confidence at all: the central government (30.3 percent), political parties 
TABLE 3. KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS/ 
ORGANIZATIONS, % 
Note: a The figure in the table is the percentage for “a great deal” or “quite a lot” category; 













54.2  Civic organizations 40.3
Women’s movement 70.5 Religious organizations 43.7  The media 34.6
Civil services 66.6 Public health system 43.5  Courts 32.8




39.5  The military 28.5
Television 62.3 The media 38.0  Big companies 24.2
Labor unions 52.4 The police 33.4  Religious organizations 24.0
The police 50.2 Legal system 32.5  The police 20.3
Religious
organizations
48.9 Trade/Labor unions 31.6  The presidency 16.8
Central government 30.3 Public education system 31.6  Civil services 13.1
Big Companies 30.0 Local government 22.2  National Assembly 6.6
Political parties 10.8 Central government 22.2
National Assembly 10.8 Political parties 7.8
National Assembly 7.8
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(10.8 percent, and the National Assembly (10.8 percent) (see Table 3).
Also, the Asia Barometer surveys measure the levels of citizens’ trust 
and confidence in a number of institutions or organizations. The 2004 
survey concerned nine domestic state or public institutions (the public 
health system, the military, the police, legal system, public education 
system, local government, the central government, political parties, and 
the national legislature) and into five non-profit and private-sector 
institutions (nongovernmental organizations, religious organizations, big 
domestic companies, the media, trade or labor unions). Because of 
discrepancy in wording, it is not advisable to compare the percentage 
figures directly between the World Values Survey and AsiaBarometer 
survey. Instead, one had better take note of general pattern the two 
survey results share in the order of institutional confidence. First, on the 
whole, state or public institutions are less trusted than non-profit and 
private-sector institutions by Korean citizens. Second, among public 
institutions only, citizens trust the military, public health system, legal 
system, the police, and public education system more than the central 
government, local government, political party, and the National 
Assembly. Public institutions held by citizens in high esteem are rather 
hierarchically organized and mainly in charge of executing policies.  
Third, the National Assembly, along with political parties, is invariably 
put at the bottom rung of the confidence ladder. The legislature and 
party are public institutions that make democracy work by organizing 
and representing citizens’ interests and opinions. If we say that Korean 
public institutions are in crisis due to lack of citizens’ trust and 
confidence, the core democratic institutions constitute a case in point. 
Again, in 2005, the Sogang Survey examined citizens’ trust and 
confidence in an array of institutions or organization categories. On a 
five-point scale, either of two highest values (“trust a lot” or “trust to 
a degree”) is interpreted as revealing outright confidence in an 
institution. Based on the survey results, the institutions can be arranged 
in a descending order from the most to the least trusted: civic 
organizations (40.3 percent), the media (34.6 percent), courts (32.8 
percent), schools (31.2 percent), the military (28.5 percent), big companies 
(24.2 percent), religious organizations (24.0 percent), the police (20.3 
percent), the presidency (16.8 percent), civil services (13.1 percent), and 
the National Assembly (6.6 percent). This survey also has not failed to 
indicate that Korean citizens place the National Assembly at the bottom 
of the institutional confidence ladder.
The data from three different surveys conducted in early 2000s 
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consistently confirm that the National Assembly is less trusted than any 
other public institutions, not to speak of nonprofit and private-sector 
institutions. Not all of the Korean public institutions are facing 
confidence crisis. Citizens have relatively high levels of trust and 
confidence in public institutions of a hierarchical nature, such as the 
military and police. In contrast, the National Assembly, a key institution 
of representative democracy, is disregarded by an overwhelming 
majority of citizens. Currently in the very beginning years of the 21st 
century, citizens’ level of trust and confidence in the National Assembly 
remains at the percentages of low 10s or under. There is no doubt that 
the national legislature suffers from critical confidence deficit.
　
Cross-national comparison of citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature
Among the democracies of the world, where does Korea stand with 
regards to the aggregate level of citizens’ trust and confidence in the 
legislature? Figure 1 displays that level for each of 39 liberal democratic 
countries which were covered in the fourth wave of World Values 
Survey and also rated free by Freedom House at the time of the survey. 
Considering the regime factor, we have excluded the comparable 
percentages of non-democratic countries. The figure includes a wide 
range of liberal democracies which differ in geographical size and 
location, population, national income, and political institutional structures 
(presidential versus parliamentary, federal versus unitary, etc.).
Of the 39 national legislatures, the Iceland Althing enjoys the highest 
level of trust and confidence held by the country’s citizens. Including the 
Althing, eight national legislatures are trusted by a majority of their own 
citizens. Next to the top eight, 16 legislatures are the target of such 
positive attitude expressed by at least of one third of their citizens. In 
the lowest part of the figure, the countries, such as Peru, Lithuania, 
Korea, Argentina, and Czech constitute the bottom five whose national 
legislatures are trusted by less than 13 percent of their citizens. These 
five countries became democratized or re-democratized riding on “the 
third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991), and are undergoing 
democratic consolidation.
America (for example, Klingeman, 1999 and articles in Norris, 1999) 
reported that public institutions, especially parliaments or legislatures, 
suffered a marked erosion of citizens’ confidence during the 1990s. This 
phenomenon was explained by the growth of “critical citizens” or 
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FIGURE 1. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENT/LEGISLATURE AMONG LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES, %.
“disaffected democrats” committed to democratic values but discontented 
with the existing structures of representative democracy. Still, as seen in 
Figure 1, from a cross-national perspective, the advanced democracies 
occupy the upper half of the confidence ladder.
Figure 2 shows the current state of legislative trust and confidence for 
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FIGURE 2. TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENT/LEGISLATURE AMONG ASIAN 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, %
Asian liberal democracies included in the Asia Barometer Surveys of 
2003 and 2004, and also rated free according to the Freedom House 
index. In this figure, Korea remains at the bottom rung of another 
confidence ladder. Japan, the most advanced democracy in Asia, is a 
country where public institutions, including the Diet, operate in the 
environment of citizens’ unfavorable attitudes toward them (Wang, 
Dalton, and Shin: 2006). Despite this, Japan’s national legislature has a 
less adverse environment than the Korean National Assembly.
All bits of information analyzed from different angles tell that a 
reservoir of good feelings toward the Korean legislature has been 
drained to a level incapacitating the institution from facilitating Korea’s 
democratic consolidation. As suggested above, citizens’ evaluation of the 
performance by the legislature may explain this drainage. But there may 
exist other systemic variables working at the national level. This prods 
a thorough cross-national study, which is beyond the present objective 
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of this paper.
　　
SOURCES OF KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Multivariate analysis
To explore explanations for individual citizens’ trustful attitudes 
toward the National Assembly, we estimated a series of Ordinary Least 
Squares regression models. For the performance model through the 
partisanship model, we regressed social background variables and the 
independent variables relevant to each explanatory model on legislative 
trust and confidence. The Sogang Survey provides data about a wider 
range of explanatory variables than the Word Values Survey or 
AsiaBarometer. The analysis of the Sogang Survey data generated the 
standardized coefficients and the adjusted R2 as presented in Table 4.
In Table 4, Model I concerns the performance evaluation model; Model 
II, the member-focused model; Model III, the civic commitment model; 
and Model IV, the partisanship model. Model V is a full model which 
includes all the independent variables reaching a .10 significance level 
in the first four regression equations. The empirical fit of each model is 
judged based on the size of adjusted R2 coefficient.
At a glance, the performance evaluation model whose adjusted R2 is 
.29 surpasses any other model in explanatory power, while the civic 
commitment model with its R2 being less than .01 is the least powerful 
as an explanation. In-between, the member-focused model and the 
partisanship model turn out to be significant but relatively weak 
explanations.
In the performance evaluation model, the standardized coefficient of 
legislative performance is .52, showing its overwhelming importance as 
an independent variable. A more positive evaluation of the performance 
of the legislature forcefully leads to a higher level of trust and confidence 
in the legislature. Working of democracy variable is significant at the 
level of .10. The more a citizen thinks the regime works democratically, 
the more trust and confidence he or she holds targeted at the legislature 
which is an institution embedded in the regime.
The test of the member-focused model confirms that a citizen’s good 
feeling about the district representative of the National Assembly 
expectedly transforms into a trustful mind toward the institution. Also 
as expected, a citizen’s cognition of the member’s activity also leads to 
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TABLE 4. SOURCES OF KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (2005): OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (Standardized 
Coefficients)
Note: * p〈 .10, ** p〈 .05, *** p〈 .01. 
positive attitude toward the legislature. In this model, education shows 
a significantly negative relationship with legislative trust and confidence. 
In Korea, educated citizens are more critical of and less trustful of the 
Independent
Variables
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ
Sex -.02 -.03 -.03 -.04
Age -.01 -.03 -.01 -.01
Education -.05 -.09** -.07* -.07** -.04*
Income -.02 -.03 -.04 -.03
Legislative performance .52*** .51***
Working of democracy .04* .04*
Government does right .04
Like member from one district .16*** .08***








Uri Party preference -.15*** -.06**
GNP preference -.07** -.01
DLP preference -.04
Adjusted R2 .29 .04 .01 .03 .31
N 1,189 1,187 1,182 1,186 1,189
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legislature.
The civic commitment model provides little explanatory power. Only 
education remains statistically significant, and again it is negatively 
related to legislative trust and confidence. The partisanship proves its 
explanatory power to some extent, though not remarkably. Ideologically 
conservatives are more trustful of the legislature than progressives. The 
strength of party preference either for the Uri Party or Grand National 
Party reveals a significant, negative relationship with legislative trust and 
confidence. Of the two party preference variables, the Uri Party 
preference is a better predictor. At the time of the Sogang Survey, no 
single party controlled the National Assembly. Of a total of 298 seats 
(with one vacancy), 49 percent (145 seats) were occupied by the Uri Party 
and 43 percent (125 seats) by the Grand National Party. The third largest 
Democratic Labor Party held nine seats; and still minor splinter parties 
and independents altogether, the remaining 19 seats. In the beginning 
of the 17th Assembly, the Uri Party started with a bare majority of 152 
seats (51 percent), but it lost about half a dozen seats mostly due to court 
rulings on illegal election campaigning. Under the circumstances that 
either of the two large parties could not command a majority, citizens 
with a stronger preference toward either one might be led to less trustful 
of the legislature. In the test of the partisanship model, education proves 
consistently negative in association with trust and confidence in the 
legislature.
In a full model (Model V), all the significantly emerging variables from 
Model I through Model IV except for two, know the member’s activity 
and GNP preference, keep their statistical significance. By adding the 
member-focused model and the partisanship model to the performance 
evaluation model, the adjusted R2 has increased to .31 from that of the 
performance evaluation model, .29. All this indicates that citizens’ overall 
performance evaluation regarding the National Assembly best accounts 
for their trustful attitude toward it. Other explanations based on citizens’ 
attitudes the members and also on their party preference are just 
supplementary.
We repeated identical analytic procedures using the 2001 World Values 
Survey and 2004 Asia Barometer data. This time some variables were 
newly added and others were omitted depending on the availability of 
questionnaire items. The four models were serially estimated, and finally 
a full model was constructed for each of the two dataset (see Appendix 
for the measurement of the variables). The test results of these two full 
models are shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 5. SOURCES OF KOREAN CITIZENS’ TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (2001, 2004): OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (Standardized 
Coefficients)
Note: * p〈 .10, ** p〈 .05, *** p〈 .01.
In the analysis of the World Values Survey data, the explanatory 
power of ideology relevant to the partisanship model proved nil. Above 
all, the variables related to the performance evaluation model exhibited 
their salience as independent factors explaining legislative trust and 
confidence. A citizen’s belief in the responsiveness of the central 
government is a strong predictor of his or her trustful attitude toward 
the National Assembly. The legislature interacts closely with the 
executive branch in the process of national governance. Citizens’ positive 
attitudes toward one institution are intertwined with those toward the 
other. The member-focused model is also empirically valid. Satisfaction 
with the way members of the National Assembly are handling national 
affairs spills over and turns into good will toward the legislature. Unlike 
its insignificance in Table 4, the variable of political interest becomes 
significant in the present analysis. The civic commitment model may not 
Independent
Variables
World Values Survey 
(2001) Ⅵ
Asia Barometer Survey 
(2004) VII




Working of democracy .03 .12 ***
Responsive government .48 *** .39 ***
Government for the people .08 ***
Satisfaction with Assembly members .10 *** .08 **
Political interest .06 **
Political efficacy .01
Democratic commitment .01
Adjusted R2 .35 .22
N 907 732
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be totally futile for explaining legislative support and confidence. Among 
the social background variables, education persistently shows its 
negative effect on trustful mind toward the legislature. Interestingly this 
analysis produces evidence that females trust the National Assembly 
more than males.
The regression analysis of the Asia Barometer data reinforces the 
findings discussed above. Performance evaluation variables are most 
important. Citizens who trust the central government to operate in the 
best interests of the society are highly likely to trust also the National 
Assembly in the same manner. As in the case of the 2005 Sogang Survey 
data, evaluation of regime performance gains vigor in explaining 
legislative trust and confidence. The member-focused model remains 
viable: the variable of satisfaction with Assembly members exerts a 
positive impact on the dependent variable. Finally, it is shown again that 
women are more prone to put confidence in the legislature than men.
To recapitulate, the trustworthiness of the National Assembly among 
the citizens greatly hinges on their perception of the performance of the 
legislature itself, the executive branch interacting with the legislature, 
and the whole regime. Citizens’ liking for their own district 
representatives or satisfaction with general members of the legislature 
constitutes a good source of their positive attitude toward the institution. 
More educated citizens are likely to be less trustful of the legislature.
Citizens’ evaluation of legislative performance revisited
Based on aggregated survey responses, this study has corroborated a 
longitudinal erosion of citizens’ trust and confidence in the National 
Assembly since the country’s democratization and suggested their 
increasingly critical evaluation of the overall performance by the 
legislature as the main cause of the eroding trustful attitude toward it. 
Furthermore, the individual-level analysis in the study has confirmed a 
citizen’s evaluation of the overall performance by the legislature as the 
uttermost significant determinant of the individual’s trust and confidence 
in the legislative institution.
Do Korean citizens judge the performance of the National Assembly 
more poorly than before because the legislature has done less and less 
what it is supposed to do? Is it a dormant, idle or do-nothing legislature? 
The reality is that the Korean legislature in this democratic era operates 
under an increasingly heavier workload and schedule. The members are 
now more and more engaged in their legislative activities. For example, 
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in the National Assembly with its committee-centered legislative process, 
there arises a great time demand on the members from the schedule of 
committee meetings. The yearly average of meeting days for the 
committees, standing and special altogether, during each legislative 
period generally increased over the whole span of the democratic era. 
Moreover it sharply did so in the recent decade: 406 days for the 13th 
Assembly (1988~1992), 318 for the 14th Assembly (1992~1996), 377 for the 
15th Assembly (1996~2000), 476 for the 16th Assembly (2000~2004), and 
610 for the present 17th Assembly (in its first half from 2004 through 
2006). Also, its legislative capacity has grown remarkably. For example, 
the average number of bills enacted per year has dramatically 
augmented: from a low of 121.5 in the 13th Assembly to a high of 372.5 
in the 17th Assembly (Park, 2006). In light of these measures, the 
National Assembly has done more work over the past two decades.
Politicians working in the national legislature are not lazier at all than 
their predecessors. Then why do their citizens negatively assess the 
overall job performance of the legislature manned with busy and 
hardworking members? To this question, we will answer as follows: it 
is because National Assembly members continually keep fighting each 
other as before and further the fighting probably has become severer 
than usual at a critical time when they are expected to work productively 
and efficiently than ever. The national legislature continues to lack in its 
capability to resolve political conflict and build consensus. Actually, 
inter-party or executive-legislative conflict has further intensified in the 
recent legislative periods of the National Assembly. The incidences of 
conflict are abundant, which have eventually made attentive citizens sick 
and tired of political actors involved, including inevitably the boisterous 
legislature. In the 2005 Sogang Survey, respondents having evaluated the 
performance of the legislature unfavorably were further asked why they 
judged so. The most frequently mentioned reason is that National 
Assembly members are too much swayed by partisan interests and 
tactics (62 percent). The next frequent response is the National Assembly 
members have no quality and capability to do their job well (32 percent). 
The other reasons are that interest groups or civic organizations have too 
strong influence on and excessively intervene in members’ activity (3 
percent) and that the executive often dominates over the National 
Assembly (3 percent). In Korean citizens’ eyes, partisan bickering is the 
most salient reason for their blaming the National Assembly.
The case of impeachment against President Roh Moo-hyun by the 
National Assembly in March 2004 dramatically illustrates the most 
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intense conflict that escalated on the legislative arena in recent years. On 
February 24 in 2004, President Roh publicly stated his will to support 
his Uri Party in the upcoming April general election for the 17th 
Assembly. On March 3, the National Election Commission ruled that the 
president’s remarks violated the election law requiring political 
neutrality of government officials in elections. The leaders of the Grand 
National Party and Millennium Democratic Party as well mentioned that 
they would have President Roh impeached if he did not deliver an 
apology. On March 9, the two parties submitted an impeachment motion 
against the president for his breach of the election law. In response, on 
March 11, President Roh at a televised press conference refused to make 
such an apology. On the next day, the National Assembly dominated by 
the Grand National Party, Millennium Democratic Party, and the United 
Liberal Democrats combined impeached the president on the charges of 
election-law violation, corruption, and incompetence by a vote of 193-2 
(with no vote by the Uri Party members). President Roh became the first 
chief executive ever impeached since the inception of the Republic of 
Korea in 1948.
For almost three days when the impeachment vote was pending, the 
Uri Party members physically blocked the vote by keeping the Speaker 
from his podium. In the end, he ordered security guards to remove the 
blockers by force, and opened the impeachment proceedings. The vote 
started at 11:30 a.m. on March 12 and took 20 minutes to end. Just before 
noon, the Speaker announced the stunning result. Disappointed Uri Party 
members wept, cursed, and sang the national anthem. They called the 
passage of the impeachment motion “a coup d’etat by the National 
Assembly” (Park 2004).
The case of presidential impeachment clearly shows that the National 
Assembly hardly seeks the reconciliation of clashing interests and 
demands in a smooth manner. Despite that it serves as an important 
formalized setting for the interplay among political forces, it cannot 
facilely manage conflict within its deliberation process. Confrontation 
and gridlock often occur on the legislative arena. Conflict-ridden 
dynamics of legislative politics is a main cause that hinders the National 
Assembly from working properly. Citizens disappointed with partisan 
struggles pass unfavorable judgment on the performance of the 
legislature and have eventually become hardened in their distrust of it.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis discloses that the Korean National Assembly 
at the dawn of the 21st century has sunken into the quagmire of citizens’ 
distrust. Various survey results indicate that the legislative institution is 
trusted only by one out of ten citizens. There is a clear erosion of citizens’ 
trust and confidence in the legislature since the country’s democratic 
transition. A decade ago, no less than three out of ten expressed their 
trustful attitude toward the legislature. The National Assembly is the 
least trusted institution among the key institutions or organizations in 
Korea, public or private. By a cross-national comparison of liberal 
democracies over the world, we find that only a few national legislatures 
are less trusted by their people than the Korean National Assembly.
The analysis has also verified the validity of performance-based 
explanation for citizens’ trust and confidence in the legislature. At the 
aggregate level, an erosion of legislative trust and confidence is 
associated with an increase in the negative evaluation of legislative 
performance. At the individual level, a citizen’s legislative trust and 
confidence depends mainly on his or her evaluation of legislative, 
governmental, and regime performance.
In most Korean citizens’ view, the National Assembly makes a poor 
record, not because it does little, but because the members are trying 
frantically to pursue their partisan interests. More and more citizens 
despair of naked power struggle among political parties and of existing 
politicians’ inability to accommodate their positions on the stage of 
legislative politics.
One cannot imagine the country’s successful consolidation of 
democracy without the legislature trusted by a great bulk of the 
citizenry. The legislature is a major setting for the interplay of significant 
political forces and is expected to contribute to an orderly and effective 
management of societal conflicts. This expected role can be fulfilled when 
ordinary citizens respect and comply with the enactments and other 
policy outputs made by the legislature. In short, an essential condition 
for a viable legislature is a reservoir of citizens’ good feelings toward 
it. In reality, however, the National Assembly is an object of deepening 
public disenchantment due to on-going inter-party confrontations and 
hence the improper working of the legislature. As long as the current 
practice of legislative politics persists, the National Assembly even with 
its heightened constitutional status and emerging policy activism may 
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not be capable of serving as a key, reliable agent of democratic 
consolidation on Korean soil.
The study strongly suggests that the members of the National 
Assembly should change their way of doing things in order to build up 
their good reputation among the citizens. Politicians should exert efforts 
at transforming their parties into policy-oriented, responsible, and 
internally democratic entities. Also they need to moderate their positions, 
build cross-party coalitions as readily as they can, and resolve conflict 
based on established rules of operation. In order to restore citizens’ trust 
and confidence targeted at political institutions, notably the National 
Assembly, Korean politicians must learn a valuable lesson from the 
following maxim: Heaven helps those who help themselves.
　
APPENDIX: MEASURES OF VARIABLES IN REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Trust in the National Assembly
(2005) To what extent do you trust the National Assembly? 1 = do not 
trust at all, 2 = rather not trust, 3 = so-so, 4 = trust to a degree, 5 = trust 
a lot.
(1988, 1990, 1996, 2001) For the national parliament/legislature, could 
you tell me how much confidence you have in it? 1 = none at all, 2 = 
not very much, 3 = quite a lot, 4 = a great deal. 
(2003, 2004) Please indicate to what extent you trust the National 
Assembly to operate in the best interests of society. 1 = don’t trust at 
all, 2 = don’t really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot.
Legislative performance 
(2005) In your view, how well or poorly does the National Assembly 
perform its role? 1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = so-so, 4 = rather well, 
5 = very well.
Working of democracy 
(2005) To what extent do you think our country’s politics works 
democratically? 1 = It works very undemocratically, 2 = It works quite 
undemocratically, 3 = It tends to work democratically, 4 = It works very 
democratically.
(2001) On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing 
in our country? 1 = not at all satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = rather 
satisfied, 4 = very satisfied.
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(2004) Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the 
democratic system.
1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = somewhat dissatisfied, 3 = neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat satisfied, 5 = very satisfied.
Government does right 
(2005) In your opinion, to what extent is the government doing the 
right thing? 1 = mostly not right, 2 = more often not right, 3 = relatively 
quite right, 4 = almost all right.
Responsive government 
(2001) For the central government, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in it? 1 = none at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = quite 
a lot, 4 = a great deal = 4.
(2004) Please indicate to what extent you trust the central government 
to operate in the best interests of society. 1 = don’t trust at all, 2 = don’t 
really trust, 3 = trust to a degree, 4 = trust a lot 
Government for the people 
(2001) Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by 
a few interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit 
of all the people? 1 = run by a few big interests, 2 = run for all the people.
Like member from own district 
(2005) How do you feel about the National Assembly member elected 
from your own district? 1 = dislike very much, 2 = somewhat dislike, 
3 = neither dislike nor like, 4 = somewhat like, 5 = like very much.
Know the member’s activity 
(2005) How well do you know about what your own member is doing? 
1 = do not know at all, 2 = do not rather know well, 3 = know somewhat 
well, 4 = know very well.
Satisfaction with Assembly members 
(2001) How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national 
office are handling the country’s affairs? 1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = fairly 
dissatisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, 4 = very satisfied.
(2004) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: Generally speaking, the people who are elected to 
the National Assembly stop thinking about the public once they’re 
elected. 1= strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 
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= agree, 5 = strongly agree.
Political interest 
(2005) How much are you interested in politics? 1 = not at all, 2 = not 
much, 3 = a little, 4 = very much.
(2001) How much are you interested in politics? 1 = not at all 
interested, 2 = not very, 3 = somewhat interested, 4 = very interested
Political efficacy: an average score of the responses to two items as 
below.
(2005) For people like me, politics is too complicated to understand; 
People like me do not influence what the government does. 1 = strongly 
agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = strongly disagree.
(2004) Generally speaking, people like me don’t have the power to 
influence government policy or actions; Politics and government are so 
complicated that sometimes I don’t understand what’s happening. 1 = 
strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 
5 = strongly disagree.
Political discussion 
(2005) How often do you talk about politics with people around you? 
1 = rarely, 2 = once or twice a month, 3 = once or twice a week, 4 = 
three or four times a week, 5 = every day.
(2001) How often discusses political matters with friends? 1 = never, 
2 = occasionally, 3 = frequently
Vote in Assembly election 
(2005): Did you vote in the 2005 general election for the 17th National 
Assembly? 1 = no, 2 = yes.
Vote in national elections 
(2004): How often do you vote in national elections? 1 = never voted, 
2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = most of the time, 5 = every time.
Organizational affiliation: a score obtained by adding the recoded 
value for the response to each of the following question. 
(2005) Are you a member of political party (labor union, civic 
organization, cooperative, and friendship club for those from your 
hometown, respectively)? 0 = no, 1 = yes.
(2001) Do you belong to labor union, political party, labor union, 
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political party, local political action group, human rights group, 
environmental group, and women’s  group, and peace movement, 
respectively)? 0 = no, 1 = yes.
Democratic commitment 
(2005) Which of the following about the political regime is closest to 
your opinion? 1 = sometimes a dictatorial regime is better than a 
democratic one, 2 = I do not care about democracy or dictatorship, 3 = 
democracy is always better than any other kind of regime.
(2001) For having a democratic political system, would you say it is 
a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this 
country? 1 = very bad, 2 = fairly bad, 3 = fairly bad, 4 = very good.
(2004) Please indicate whether you think a democratic political system 
would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country. 1= bad, 2 = 
fairly good, 3 = very good.
Ideology 
(2005) Where do you position your own ideological orientation on the 
following continuum? from 0 (progressive) to 5 (middle of the road) to 
10 (conservative).
(2001) In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” 
How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? from 
1 (left) to 10 (right).
Strength of party preference: Uri Party preference, GNP (Grand 
National Party) preference, DLP (Democratic Labor Party) preference. 
(2005) How much do you like or dislike each of the following political 
parties? 1 = dislike very much, 2 = rather dislike, 3 = neither like nor 
dislike, 4 = rather like, 5 = like very much.
Sex 
(2005, 2001, 2004) 1 = male, 2 = female.
Age 
(2005) 1 = 20 ~ 29 years old, 2 = 30 ~ 39, 3 = 40 ~ 49, 4 = 50 or over
(2001) 1 = 15 -29 years, 2 = 30 ~ 49 years, 3 = 50 and more years.
(2004) years old(not recoded)
Education
(2005) 1 = elementary school or less 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, 
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4 = college-level, 5 = graduate school
(2001) 1 = lower, 2 = middle, 3 = upper
(2004) 1 = no formal education, 2 = elementary school/junior high 
school/middle school, 3 = high school, high-school-level vocational- 
technical school, 4 = professional school/technical school, 5 = university/ 
graduate school.
Income
(2005) monthly household income (in Korean won): 1 = one million or 
less, 2 = more than one million up to 2 million, 3 = more than 2 million 
up to 3 million, 4 = more than 3 million up to 4 million, 5 = more than 
4 million up to 5 million, 6 = more than 5 million up to one thousand, 
7 = more than one thousand.
(2001) 1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high.
(2004) annual household income (in Korean won, million): 1 = 20 or 
less, 2 = 20 ~ 30, 3 = 30 ~ 40, 4 = 40 ~ 50, 5 = 50 ~ 60, 7 = 70 ~ 80, 
8 = 80 ~ 90, 9 = 90 ~ 100, 10 = 100 ~ 110, 11 = 110 ~ 120, 12 = 120 ~ 
130, 13 = 130 ~ 140, 14 = 140 ~ 150, 15 = 150 ~ 160, 16 = 160 ~ 170, 17 
= 170 ~ 180, 18 = 180 ~ 190, 19 = 190 ~ 200, 20 = more than 200.
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